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CASE COMMENTS
ILLEGAL ALIENS HAVE RIGHT TO FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION
Ply/er v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982)
In Plyler v. Doe' the United States Supreme Court extended the
reach of the equal protection clause2 by holding that a state may not
deny undocumented alien' children access to a free public education.
In 1975, the Texas legislature amended section 21.031 of the State's
education code to permit local public school boards to exclude undocu-
mented alien children from district public schools.4 Consequently, in
1977 the Board of Trustees for the Tyler Independent School District
adopted a policy that barred undocumented aliens from the local
schools unless the children paid full tuition.5 Appellees, a group of
undocumented Mexican children, filed a class action suit in federal
court6 on behalf of similarly situated undocumented alien children in
Smith County, Texas. The suit sought injunctive and declaratory relief
from appellees' exclusion from the Tyler Public Schools.7
The district court ruled that section 21.031 violated the equal protec-
tion clause and that Congress' exclusive authority in the field of immi-
1. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. This Comment uses the term "undocumented aliens" rather than the often used expres-
sion "illegal aliens" because the school district regulation in question defines a legally admitted
alien as "one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United States." Doe v. Plyler,
458 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980),
qft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982). The term "undocumented alien" is more appropriate in a broader
sense as well, because it affords the alien a presumption of innocence until the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) has determined through administrative proceedings that the alien's
presence in the United States violates some statutory provision.
4. Before the 1975 amendment, section 21.031 read in relevant part: "Every child in this
state .. shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he re-
sides .... " TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(b) (Vernon 1972) (emphasis added). After the
amendment, the same section read: "Every child in the state who is a citizen of the United States or
a legally admitted alien . .. shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in
which he resides . TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (emphasis
added).
5. 458 F. Supp. at 571. Tuition was $1000 per year. Id
6. The suit was filed through the childrens' parents as guardians ad litum.
7. Section 21.031 had successfully withstood a state court challenge in 1977. The court held
that the statute violated neither the equal protection clause nor the due process clause. Hernandez
v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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gration law preempted such legislation.' The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court' with respect to the equal protec-
tion violation but reversed on the preemption question.' On writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals and held: denial of free public education to undocumented alien
children violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1°
Congress ratified the fourteenth amendment, which includes the
equal protection clause, in 1868. Historical scholarship revealed that
there was no general agreement about the scope of the equal protection
clause at the time of its adoption." Some of the clause's supporters
perceived it as a means of eliminating all invidious legal classifications,
regardless of whom they were directed against;' 2 others believed it
should apply to those problems peculiar to the freed slave race."
The equal protection clause was first subject to judicial interpretation
in The Slaughterhouse Cases.4 At issue was a Louisiana law granting a
8. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a f'din part, rev'dinpart, 628 F.2d 448
(5th Cir. 1980), aI'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982). The court also entered a district-wide injunction
against continued enforcement of section 21.03 1. id at 593.
9. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2402. The Supreme Court did not rule on the preemption question, reason-
ing that its equal protection holding made any discussion of the preemption issue superfluous. Id
at 2391 n.8. See infra note 68.
At approximately the same time that the plaintiffs in Plyler filed suit in the Eastern District of
Texas, several other suits challenging section 21.031 were fied in the other judicial districts in
Texas. In 1979, the Judicial Panel of Multi-district Litigation consolidated into one suit all of the
cases challenging the Texas statute except Plyler. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 482 F. Supp.
326 (per curiam) (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
The trial court for the consolidated suit held that section 21.031 violated the equal protection
clause and issued a statewide injunction against its continued enforcement. In re Alien Children
Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a.f'd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382
(1982). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction without opinion. Subse-
quently, Justice Powell, acting as Circuit Justice, overturned the stay. Certain Named and Un-
named Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (Powell, Circuit Justice,
1980). The full Court then noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the case with Plyler.
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents, 452 U.S. 937
(1981).
11. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). The Supreme Court requested
that the parties in Brown examine the debates surrounding the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment in an effort to discern the framers' actual intent with regard to the scope of the equal protec-
tion clause. The Court, after evaluating the evidence, determined that the Congressional debates
were "inconclusive." Id
12. Id
13. Id
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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twenty-five year monopoly to one company to operate a slaughterhouse
business in the New Orleans area. The other slaughterhouse compa-
nies in the area brought suit, claiming inter alia that the law violated
the equal protection clause. Rejecting the excluded companies' equal
protection argument, the majority held that the clause was intended
solely to prevent discrimination against blacks.' 5
Thus narrowly defined, 6 the equal protection clause remained
largely dormant' 7 as a source of constitutional litigation for several de-
caces.' 8 The Supreme Court, however, gradually rejected the initial
narrow construction of the clause. Currently, legislative classifications
based on gender,'9 alienage,20 and illegitimacy,2' as well as laws im-
pinging on access to the ballot,22 access to the judicial system,23 and the
right of interstate travel,24 are evaluated under the equal protection'
clause.
In modem equal protection jurisprudence the Supreme Court ap-
plies one of three standards of review.25 Legislative distinctions involv-
15. Justice Miller's majority opinion doubted whether any "action of a state not directed
against Negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the
purview of [the equal protection clause]." Id at 81.
16. The equal protection clause was occasionally used during this period to strike down clas-
sifications based on race. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (white primary
election law violates the equal protection clause); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1880) (law limiting eligibility for jury service to whites violates the equal protection clause). But
see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (law requiring separate but equal facilities on
railroad cars for whites and blacks does not violate the equal protection clause).
17. The Supreme Court, however, did expand the scope of the equal protection clause in two
significant ways in 1886. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886) (equal protection clause applies to corporations); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) (equal protection clause applies to aliens).
18. Justice Holmes was moved to remark in 1927 that the equal protection clause had be-
come "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
19. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S 68
(1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
22, See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
24. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
25. The multi-tier analytical framework was developed in an ad hoc fashion. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). The Supreme Court eventu-
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ing a suspect classification26 or impinging on a fundamental right 27 are
subject to "strict scrutiny." Under this standard the classification must
be necessary to further a compelling state interest.28  Courts almost in-
evitably strike classifications evaluated under the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard.29 Most other classifications, including those based on social and
commercial distinctions, are subject to a "rational basis" standard of
review.3" To satisfy this standard, the classification must bear only a
ally embraced the multi-tier concept. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
17 (1973). Some Justices have criticized the multi-tier approach. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserts that the Court actually applies "a single standard
in a reasonably consistent fashion"); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concur-
ring) (argues that the Court actually applies many standards); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (argues that the court applies a "spectrum
of standards").
26. There are three major indicia of "suspectness." First, "suspect" classes tend to suffer
prejudicial treatment because of some "immutable characteristic determined solely by the acci-
dent of birth [which bears] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Second, "suspect" classes often have suffered from historic
discrimination. Id at 684-85. Third, "suspect" classes seldom have the ability to seek redress
through the normal political process. Id at 686 n.17. This final point is directly traceable to
Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). In Carolene Products, Justice Stone suggested that special judicial solicitude for "discrete
and insular" minorities is appropriate because of their inability to gain influence through normal
political channels. Id See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(wealth is not a suspect classification): Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1972) (some
alienage classifications are suspect); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race is
a suspect classification).
27. In order for a right to be "fundamental," it must be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (right of interstate travel deemed funda-
mental); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (right to vote is fundamen-
tal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (access to the courts is a fundamental right). But
see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (education is not a funda-
mental right); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (housing is not a fundamental inter-
est); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (court refused to find that welfare
benefits are a fundamental right). Justice Harlan criticized this strain of equal protection jurispru-
dence, arguing that it would fit more neatly into a substantive due process framework. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
29. One commentator has suggested that the scrutiny on this level is "strict in theory and
fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword- In Search ofEvolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). At
least once, however, the Supreme Court did uphold a law under this rigorous standard. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223-24 (1944) (exclusion of all persons of Japanese
ancestry from certain areas in World War II).
30. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upheld state law
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rational relationship to a permissible state objective. 3' Courts usually
uphold classifications evaluated under this less rigorous standard.32 Fi-
nally, certain classifications, typically those based on gender, are sub-
ject to an intermediate standard of review. 33  This standard requires
that the classification bear a substantial relationship to the achievement
of an important governmental objective.34
In 1973, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,35
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Texas' property
tax-based school financing system that resulted in smaller per-pupil ex-
penditures in relatively poor school districts.36  Appellees contended
that education was a fundamental right guaranteed by the United
banning sale of milk in nonreturnable containers); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (upheld state mandatory retirement age for police officers); Dan-
dndge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upheld law restricting eligibility for welfare benefits);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upheld law exempting certain businesses from Sun-
day closing laws); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upheld law prohib-
iting certain forms of advertising).
31. E.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807-09 (1969).
32. The only case striking an economic classification using "rational basis" scrutiny in the
last fifty years. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), was overruled nineteen years later in New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
33. See. e.g.. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982) (court
struck down a law limiting admission into a state-run nursing school to women); Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (gender-based distinction in Missouri workmen's
compensation law governing death benefits for widows and widowers violates the equal protection
clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (law mandating that husbands but not wives may be
required to pay alimony violates the equal protection clause); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
316-17 (1977) (per curiam) (gender-based distinction in computing old-age benfits under the So-
cial Security Act does not violate the equal protection clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (Court struck down a state law that permitted 18-20 year old females to buy beer but not
males of the same age). Moreover, a recent illegitimacy classification case used this standard of
review. Lalh v. Lali, 439 U.S., 259, 265 (1978) (upholding law that required illegitimate children
who would inherit from their fathers by intestate succession to provide a particular proof of pater-
nity). Additionally, four members of the Burger court thought benign racial classifications should
be judged on this standard. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("racial classifications designed to further
remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of these objectives' ") (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))
(citation omitted).
34. See supra note 33.
35. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
36. The Court compared two school districts in San Antonio. In the 1967-68 school year, the
property tax scheme yielded an expenditure of $333 per pupil in the wealthier district and only
$26 per pupil in the poorer district. Id at 11-13.
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States Constitution and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause.37 The Court, however, rejected this con-
tention,38 holding that laws impinging on public education are subject
to rational basis scrutiny.39
In spite of its Rodriguez holding, however, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of public education.4" The Court has as-
serted that not only is public education vital to an individual's develop-
ment,4' but it is also instrumental in the preservation of the nation's
basic political and social values.4"
The Supreme Court has also used equal protection analysis to evalu-
ate the constitutionality of laws that classify on the basis of illegiti-
macy.4 3 In Levy v. Louisiana, " for example, the Court struck down a
state law that prevented unacknowledged illegitimate children from re-
covering in a wrongful death action on behalf of a deceased parent.
Several subsequent cases similarly invalidated classifications based on
illegitimacy.45 The Court, however, has failed to articulate precisely
37. Id at 29. Appellees maintained that education is a fundamental right because it is inex-
tricably linked with constitutionally protected rights such as freedom of speech and the right to
vote. Id at 35-36.
38. Id at 34-40. The Court rejected appellee's argument, see supra note 37, by noting that
citizens were not guaranteed "the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id
at 36 (emphasis in original).
39. Id at 40.
40. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (education "fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constit-
ency") (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 294, 297 (1978)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923) ("The American people have always regarded education and the acquisition of knowl-
edge as matters of supreme importance").
41. "lIt is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
42. The Court has repeatedly emphasized public education's role in the maintenance of de-
mocracy. "Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civil institution for the preserva-
tion of a democratic system of government.' Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1971) (educa-
tion is very important for transmitting "the values on which our society rests"); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-suffi-
cient participants in society").
43. See generaly Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. Rav. 1023, 1056-60 (1979); Stenger, Expanding Constitutional Rights of Illegitimate
Children, 1968-1980, 19 J. FAm. L. 407, 407-44 (1981).
44. 319 U.S. 68 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking law that barred illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from their fathers); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973) (invalidating New Jersey welfare program restricting benefits to legitimate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/8
Number 2] ALIENS' RIGHT TO EDUCATION
the proper standard of review for illegitimacy cases.4 6 While the Court
has never found the classification to be suspect, 47 neither has it applied
the lenient rational basis standards to such cases.48 The Court typically
justifies heightened scrutiny in this area by noting that illegitimacy, like
race or gender, is a trait beyond the individual's control.
49
Moreover, the equal protection clause is used to evaluate classifica-
tions that distinguish between citizens and lawfully5" admitted aliens.5'
children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (striking law that gave legitimate children an
enforceable right of support from their fathers but gave no similar right to illegitimate children);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (striking law that prohibited illegitimate
children from recovering under Louisiana workmen's compensation program). But see Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding law that required illegitimate children who would inherit
intestate from their fathers to provide a particular proof of paternity); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495 (1976) (sustaining Social Security provision that disadvantaged illegitimate children); Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding law that narrowly defined when an illegitimate child
might take by intestate succession).
46. Professor Gunther has written, "The Court's course in reviewing classifications based on
illegitimacy has been (to put it mildly) a wavering one. In no area of classifications triggering
occasional heightened scrutiny have the Court's actions been more unpredictable-and more inar-
ticulate in explaining what degree of heightened scrutiy is warranted, and why." G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 896-97 (10th ed. 1980). Compare Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532, (1971) (absent "a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for [the] legislature, not
[this] Court, to select from possible laws") with Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (illegitimacy
classifications are invalid "if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests").
47. In Matthews v. Lucas, the Court articulated its reason for refusing to apply strict scrutiny
to illegitimacy classifications:
[P]erhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the par-
ents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an
obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates has never ap-
proached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination
against women and Negroes.
Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
48. In no case, with the possible exception of Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), has the
Court applied the rational basis standard of review to an illegitimacy classification.
49. The Court has elsewhere suggested that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when a classi-
fication is based on some "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth
[which bears] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Certainly, it is difficult to comprehend how an individual's illegitimacy
will have any bearing on his ability to make a social contribution.
50. The Supreme Court initially concerned itself only with the rights of those aliens who
were legally present in the United States. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Court first considered the constitutional rights
of undocumented aliens in Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982). See infra notes 58-64 and accom-
panying text.
51. Some commentators have urged that laws classifying on the basis of alienage should be
evaluated under the preemption doctrine rather than the equal protection clause. See generally
Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069
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In Graham v. Richardson, 52 for instance, the Supreme Court struck
down a state law that restricted welfare benefits to citizens. In reaching
its holding, the Graham Court asserted that aliens constitute a suspect
class, and accordingly, classifications based on alienage should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.53 Two years later, however, the Court retreated
somewhat from the Graham holding, suggesting that a lower level of
scrutiny is appropriate when states exclude aliens from consideration
for government jobs that are essential to the preservation of representa-
tive government . 4 Subsequent cases have upheld laws requiring dep-
(1979); Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: 4 New Preemption Anaysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940
(1980).
In the leading preemption case in the immigration area, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976),
the Supreme Court held that Congress had never so completely occupied the field of immigration
as to render all state legislation creating alienage-based classifications automatically invalid
through the preemption doctrine. Id at 355. States may enact legislation dealing with undocu-
mented aliens if such legislation complements a federal objective. Id at 363.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), is
the principal federal statute regulating immigration. This act makes unlawful entry into this
country a crime punishable by fine, imprisonment, or deportation. Id §§ 1251-52, 1325. A major
overhaul of the act was nearly passed by the 97th Congress. The bill's most notable feature was its
extension of amnesty to most aliens who had unlawfully entered the United States before January
1, 1980. See S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
52. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
53. "[Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inher-
ently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a
'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id at
372 (citation omitted). Aliens seem to meet some but not all of the traditional indicia of "suspect-
ness." See supra note 26. Because an alien who is willing to go through the proper procedures
may become a naturalized American citizen, alienage is not an immutable characteristic. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-59 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). There has
been some debate about whether equal protection is the proper framework within which to evalu-
ate alienage-based classifications. Some commentators maintain that these issues should be
viewed in a federal-state regulation context. See supra note 51.
54. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), Justice Blackmun outlined the contours of
this exception to the Graham strict scrutiny rule:
[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within
a state's constitutional prerogatives. This is no more than a recognition of a state's his-
torical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions,
and a recognition ofa state's constitutional responsibility for the establishment and oper-
ation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appropriate designated
class of public office holders.... A restriction on the employment of noncitizens, nar-
rowly confined, could have particular relevance to this important state responsibility for
alienage itself is a factor that reasonably could be employed in defining 'political
community.'
Id at 648-49 (citations omitted).
The result of the Dougall exception is an equal protection anomaly. Alienage-based classifica-
tions are sometimes--but not always-suspect. This double-standard is best understood in the
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uty probation officers,55 schoolteachers, 56 and police officers5 7 to be
American citizens.
The question of what constitutional rights an undocumented alien
enjoys58 while in the United States has not been extensively litigated.59
In Wong Wing v. United States, I the Supreme Court held that undocu-
mented aliens are entitled to due process guarantees.6 Moreover,
lower court decisions indicate that undocumented aliens have a right of
access to the judicial system. 2 Lower courts that have considered the
issue of whether the equal protection clause applies to undocumented
aliens have generally concluded that the aliens are entitled to equal
protection. 3 Until 1982, the Supreme Court had never addressed the
context of federal-state relations. Some alienage-based classifications reflect on functions so cen-
tral to a state's sovereignty that the federal government will not intervene.
55. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
56. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
57. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
58. See generally Comment, The Legal Status of UndocumentedAliens: In Search of a Consis-
tent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667 (1979).
59. Undocumented aliens are understandably reluctant to file lawsuits in which their un-
documented status is an issue. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 579 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a f'd
in part, rey'd in part, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), af'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
60. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
61. Subsequent cases have reaffirmed Wong Wing. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (undocumented
alien may assert an illegal search claim); Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (2d Cir. 1975)
(undocumented alien may seek an injunction against deportation); Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons,
396 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (undocumented alien may bring a personal injury suit);
Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D.V.I. 1971) (undocumented alien may bring a
divorce action).
63. All three federal courts that ruled directly on the validity of the Texas undocumented
alien schoolchildren statute concluded that the equal protection clause applied to undocumented
aliens. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982); In re Alien
Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a 'd sb nom. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.
Ct. 2382 (1982); Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 579 (E.D. Tex. 1978), a f'd inpart, rev'd in part,
628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aj'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982). See also Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d
1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We can readily agree that the due process and equal protection clauses
... [apply to] aliens whose presence here is illegal"); Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380,
1383 (D.V. I. 1971) ("To deny an alien access to our divorce courts on the sole ground that he may
be in violation of an immigration law would be to deny. . . the equal protection of the laws.").
But see United States v. Tsuda Maru, 479 F. Supp. 519, 521 (D. Alaska 1979) ("the underlying
rationale of the [equal protection] doctrine limits its applicability to persons who have been admit-
ted for permanent residence under immigration laws").
The fourteenth amendment due process clause applies to "any person." The equal protection
clause, on the other hand, applies to "any person within its jurisdiction." The state of Texas, in
opposing the extension of equal protection guarantees to undocumented aliens, argued that this
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issue.64
In 1982, in Pl/er v. Doe,65 the Supreme Court ruled that the equal
protection clause does indeed apply to undocumented aliens,66 and that
the Texas statute denying undocumented alien schoolchildren access to
free public education violated the equal protection clause.6 7 Writing
for a majority of five, Justice Brennan first confronted the threshold
issue of whether undocumented aliens are entitled to equal protec-
tion 8 In concluding affirmatively, 69 the majority rejected the proposi-
tion that the equal protection clause was intended to apply to a more
limited set of persons than the due process clause.70
The majority next dealt with the question of which equal protection
standard of review to apply in evaluating section 21.031. Although un-
documented aliens are not members of a suspect class7' and education
is not a fundamental right,72 Justice Brennan nevertheless concluded
that some form of heightened scrutiny was appropriate. 3
Even though education is not a fundamental right, Justice Brennan
difference in language means that the equal protection clause applies to a narrower class of people
than the due process clause. See Brief for Appellant at 14-18, Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382
(1982).
64. Certain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S.
1327, 1329 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980) ("no precedent of this Court directly supports [the lower
court ruling that the equal protection clause applies to undocumented aliens]").
65. 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
66. Id at 2394.
67. Id at 2402.
68. 'The Court summarily disposed of the preemption issue, reasoning that the disposition of
the equal protection question rendered the preemption argument irrelevant. Id at 2391 n.8.
69. Id
70. The Court argued that the "within its jurisdiction" language of the equal protection
clause, see supra note 63, actually supports the conclusion that everyone who is physically present
within a state's territory enjoys equal protection guarantees:
That a person's initial entry into a state, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that
he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within
the state's territorial perimeter. . . . And until he leaves the jurisdiction-either volun-
tarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United
States-he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a state may choose to
establish.
Id at 2394.
71. The Court noted that an alien's undocumented status is not immutable and is in fact
attributable to a voluntary choice. Id at 2396.n.19. Thus one of the indicia of suspectness is not
present here. See supra note 26.
72. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 2398. The absence of a suspect classification or fundamental right usually
indicates that the classification should be evaluated on the rational basis standard. See supra
notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
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reasoned, it is vital to the maintenance of the nation's basic political
institutions74 and is indispensible to the individual child's future well-
being.75 Moreover, Justice Brennan, citing a leading case on illegiti-
macy classifications,76 noted that because undocumented children sel-
dom enter the United States of their own volition, section 21.031
punishes them for the transgressions of their parents.7 Consequently,
in order for section 21.031 to survive equal protection scrutiny, the state
of Texas must show that it had a substantial state interest at stake.78
Justice Brennan then examined the possible state interests behind
section 21.031. He rejected Texas' major contention that appellees sta-
tus as undocumented aliens vel non provided a rational basis for their
exclusion from the free public schools.79 In addition, he summarily
dismissed each of the remaining asserted state interests: (1) preserva-
tion of scarce resources for the state's lawful residents;8" (2) deterrence
of illegal entry into the United States;81 (3) prevention of special bur-
dens placed on local school districts,82 and (4) prevention of the waste
of funds spent on individuals who are likely to leave the United States
74. Id at 2397. See supra note 42.
75. Id at 2397. See supra note 41.
76. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). Justice Brennan
quoted from Weber:
[V]isiting. . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover,
imposing disabilities on the... child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the. . . child is an ineffec-
tual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Id at 2396 (citation and footnote omitted).
77. Id
78. 102 S. Ct. at 2398. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 2400. The Court argued that if a state classifies on the basis of undocu-
mented alienage, that classification must mirror some federal objective. See supra note 51. The
Court could find no evidence that Congress ever intended to deprive undocumented aliens of the
opportunity to attend free public schools.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2400. Justice Brennan remarked that "a concern for the preservation of
resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources."
id
81. Id at 2400-01. The Py/er Court noted that the bulk of undocumented aliens enter the
United States for economic, not educational purposes. Thus, if the state sought to deter illegal
entry, section 21.031 was a singularly ineffective way to do so.
82. Id. at 2401. Justice Brennan relied on the district court's determination that the exclusion
of undocumented aliens would have no appreciable effect on the quality of education that the
other pupils receive. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 583 (S.D. Tex.
1980), af'dub norn Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
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eventually. 83
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell provided separate concur-
ring opinions. Justice Marshall emphasized his belief that education
should be regarded as a fundamental right.8 4 In addition, he reiterated
his criticism of the multi-tier approach to equal protection analysis.8 5
Justice Blackmun, in contrast, agreed with the majority that education
is not a fundamental right, but argued that laws that completely deny a
class of people access to an education should be subjected to some form
of heightened scrutiny.86 Finally, Justice Powell elaborated on the ma-
jority's analogy to the illegitimacy cases87 and chastised the federal
government for its inability to halt the influx of undocumented aliens.88
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, wrote a sharp dissent. The Chief Justice asserted that any
form of heightened scrutiny was improper because, as the majority
noted, the Texas law implicated neither a suspect class nor a funda-
mental right.89 Moreover, he believed that the state's asserted interest
in limiting expenditures was permissible and that section 21.031 bore a
rational relationship to this interest.90 Chief Justice Burger concluded
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2401-02. The Court pointed out that many undocumented aliens are never
deported and continue to live in the United States indefinitely.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall first maintained that edu-
cation should be considered a fundamental right in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 110-17 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believes that the special
relationship between education and the preservation of basic first amendment values renders edu-
cation a fundamental right. Id
85. 102 S. Ct. at 2402 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall asserted that the Court has
actually applied a spectrum of standards in equal protection cases. Id at 2498-99. See supra note
25.
86. Justice Blackmun argued by analogy to the equal protection-voting cases. See supra note
22. While neither voting nor education are explicitly protected by the Constitution, he argued that
both should be subject to the equal protection clause because they are extraordinary rights. He
asserted that "[D]enial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former
relegates the individual to second-class social status, the latter places him at a permanent political
disadvantage." 102 S. Ct. at 2404 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. [T]he state of Texas effectively denies to the school age children of illegal aliens the
opportunity to attend the free public schools that the state makes available to all resi-
dents. They are excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents
or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country un-
lawfully. The respondent children are innocent in this respect.
Id at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
88. Justice Powell suggested that the federal government might help the states defray the cost
of educating undocumented aliens. Id at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. The Chief Justice accused the majority
"of an unabashedly result-oriented approach." Id at 2409 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2412 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice admitted that the state
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that the legislature should ultimately decide whether undocumented
alien children should receive a free public education. 9'
P 'ler v. Doe was correctly decided. Justice Brennan, however, takes
a somewhat tortuous path to reach the correct result. Although the ma-
jority summarily dismisses the preemption issue as irrelevant,92 the is-
sue is thinly disguised and raised again later in the opinion. In
rejecting Texas' argument that the aliens' undocumented status vel non
provided a rational basis for the law, Justice Brennan remarked that
states may legislate with respect to undocumented aliens only if the
state law mirrors some federal goal.93 He argued further that there was
no evidence that Congress had ever intended to deny a free public edu-
cation to undocumented aliens.94 If Justice Brennan perceived a con-
flict between the objectives of the Texas statute and a federal policy, he
should have resolved the issue by explicit reference to the preemption
doctrine.95
By subsuming under the equal protection framework the question of
exactly how a state may legislate with respect to undocumented aliens,
the Court diminished the relevance of its holding for both preemption
and equal protection jurisprudence. At one point in the opinion, for
instance, Justice Brennan seems to imply that Congress might be able
to prohibit the use of federal funds for the education of undocumented
alien children.96 This, combined with Plyler's ultimate holding, gives
rise to the inference that the equal protection clause may occasionally
goal of preservation of resources would not be a permissible reason for denying benefits arbitrarily
to some group. He felt, however, that there was no arbitrary denial here because undocumented
aliens have no right to be in this country.
91. The Chief Justice concluded his opinion by asserting that "[t]he solution to this seemingly
intractable problem is to defer to the political processes, unpalatable as that may be to some." Id
at 2414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. See supra notes 10 & 68.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2399. The Court here cites the leading preemption decision in the field of
immgration, DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
94. See supra note 79.
95. Some commentators have argued that the preemption doctrine is a preferential frame-
work within which to evaluate alienage-based classifications. See supra notes 51 & 53. The same
can be said about undocumented alienage classifications. The Court was obviously sensitive to
federalism questions in Plyler and should have been more explicit about the role those questions
played in the final disposition of the case.
96 Justice Brennan remarked, "[b]ut in the area of special constitutional sensitivity
presented by this case, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present
legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the state in denying these children
an elementary education." 102 S. Ct. at 2400 (emphasis added).
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place greater restrictions on states and their freedom to classify than it
does on the federal government.97 Case law directly contradicts this
proposition.
The Court's decision to apply a heightened level of scrutiny is sound.
Justice Brennan's conclusion that undocumented aliens do not consti-
tute a suspect class seems reasonable. An alien's undocumented status
is certainly not immutable99 nor is it always unrelated to a legitimate
state purpose.0 Moreover, the proposition that education is not a fun-
damental right is firmly established.101 Yet, the Court properly creates
a special niche for education. While education is not a fundamental
right, neither is it an ordinary government benefit. The Court consis-
tently recognizes its significant role in shaping and inculcating basic
values." 2 Thus, a law impinging on one's ability to obtain an educa-
tion should be subject to an intermediate standard of review.
The standard of review adopted by the Ply/er Court, however, is un-
clear. The language used by Justice Brennan simultaneously suggests
application of the rational basis standard and the intermediate stan-
dard." 3 Although the Court clearly is employing a heightened level of
97. Once again the preemption and equal protection issues are confused. Justice Brennan's
argument is plausible on preemption grounds, but is dubious as an equal protection principle.
The equal protection clause restricts all governments in the same fashion. Otherwise the principal
of equality, which is the central tenet of equal protection, would seem to be violated.
98. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment constrains the federal government in the same manner as the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment constrains the states. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954).
99. See supra note 26. The undocumented alien can always leave the United States. He may
often be able to become a lawful resident. One expert testified in the district court that 50 to 60%
of current legal aliens originally entered this country illegally. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569,
577 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ar'd in part, rev'dinpart, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), a'd, 102 S. Ct. 2382
(1982).
100. For example, a state's decision to ban undocumented aliens from voting or holding office
seems entirely reasonable.
101. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
103. Justice Brennan described the standard as follows: "Section 21.031 can hardly be consid-
ered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state." 102 S. Ct. at 2398 (emphasis
added). The word "rational," of course, suggests "rational basis" review while the word "substan-
tial" is normally associated with the Craig v. Boren formulation of the intermediate standard. See
supra notes 25-34.
Moreover, the Plyer standard is unclear in another sense. Equal protection standards typically
have two components: an end component and a means-end relationship component. For exam-
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scrutiny, Justice Brennan fails to explain how this application of the
intermediate standard differs from more traditional formulations or
why the Court did not use those formulations.
The position of the dissenters, on the other hand, is unduly deferen-
tial. Undocumented aliens are a classic example of a "discrete and in-
sular" minority. 04 They may not vote or hold office.' 5 Moreover, an
organized lobbying effort would subject to deportation all those un-
documented alien participants who identify themselves as such. The
judiciary should be especially sensitive to the possibility that the polit-
ical process will not react favorably to the legitimate grievances of un-
documented aliens.
Plyler will have a limited impact on subsequent decisions.10 6 Fears
that the case may lead to the invalidation of laws that exclude undocu-
mented aliens from social welfare programs'0 7 are unfounded. The
Court's focus on the unique character of education narrows the poten-
tial reach of the decision. Laws that classify on the basis of undocu-
mented alienage with respect to ordinary government benefits will
almost certainly be upheld.
The Ply/er Court reached a just and humane result from the perspec-
tive of social policy.'08 As constitutional doctrine, however, the deci-
ple, strict scrutiny requires the classification to be necessary (means-end component) to a compel-
ling state interest (end component). The Ply/er standard only addresses the ends component,
mandating that the end be "substantial." The Court fails to articulate a means-end relationship
requirement.
104. See supra note 53.
105. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more politically powerless group than undocu-
mented aliens. The formal barriers to political participation-prohibitions against voting and
holding office--combine with more informal obstacles such as language and cultural differences to
render undocumented aliens politically impotent.
106. Texas is the only state to pass a law banning undocumented aliens from the free public
schools. Washington Post, June 16, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
107. See Washington Post, June 16, 1982, at Al, col. 1. Along with other social classifications,
the Court usually evaluates laws bearing on welfare benefits and entitlement programs under the
"rational basis" standard. A law restricting welfare benefits to those who are in the United States
lawfully would probably satisfy this lower standard. Cf Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)
(suggests Congress may withhold government benefits to lawfully admitted aliens).
108. Banning undocumented alien children from the free public schools would likely result in
a permanent sub-class of individuals, barred from most types of employment by their lack of
education.
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sion is confusing and will probably have little permanent effect on
equal protection jurisprudence.
D.A. W.
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